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Abstract 
Israel’s policies regarding Lebanon have been dependent on public opinion, which is very volatile. 
The citizens of Israel did not favor the occupation of the security zone in South Lebanon because of 
the Four Mothers movement, and it influenced the government to withdraw military forces 
unilaterally in May 2000. When Hizbollah attacked the Israel Defense Force (IDF) patrol and 
abducted two soldiers on the northern border, the Israeli citizens supported the government’s 
decision of waging a war in retaliation. 
  This study aims to shed light on the causal mechanism of the influence of public opinion on the 
defense policy in the rational framework of deterrence strategy. I chose the evolutionary game 
theory approach as my research method. My study yielded the following result: the deterrence is 
not stable when the aggression level of the defenders is less than the level of the critical condition. 
The Israeli government made a decision to conduct unilateral withdrawal under the pressure of 
passive defenders among the people. However, the IDF could begin the operation in Lebanon 
because of a substantial number of supporters who hoped to restore the deterrence. This study 
concludes that the Israelis exhibited strong intension and an aggressive attitude toward the 
deterrence. 
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1. Israel Security and Deterrence Theory 
Deterrence is considered to be one of the essential concepts of national security or the most 
sophisticated analytical framework among the security studies under the discipline of international 
politics.
1
 Political scientists have developed suitable theories of deterrence in different armed systems 
or situations such as nuclear deterrence or unconventional deterrence for conflicts involving nuclear 
weapons,
2
 and conventional deterrence
3
 for conventional arms conflicts among nations. Further, it is 
appropriate for asymmetrical conflicts between sovereign states and armed organizations or terrorists. 
The argument about deterrence is not necessarily systematic and has not been developed further 
because numerous researchers have entered this field in different contexts. 
The concept of deterrence is popular and commonly used not only in the Israeli defense doctrine, but 
also in academic material on Middle Eastern international politics. Avner Yaniv and Yair Evron 
contributed to historical as well as theoretical deterrence studies in the context of Israeli national 
security.
4
 Inbar (1996: 71) states that deterrence is one of the three pillars of the Israeli military 
doctrine. The state of Israel has developed its conventional military power so as to deter the Arab 
states from launching a massive attack with support of the United States. The other pillars such as 
early warning and a decisive victory are emphasized in the crisis stage in case of failure of 
conventional deterrence. The Israel’s formula for victory is to mobilize the reservists in the wake of an 
early warning in order to strike the enemies intensively and force them to the status quo. 
Conventional deterrence for Arab-Israel warfare has not been considered to be a very important 
issue among political and military leaders after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Instead, both leaderships 
and ordinary citizens are more concerned about smaller scale violence or low intensive conflicts (LIC) 
such as terrorism. There is an endemic problem of counter-terror in the framework of deterrence 
because it is almost impossible to completely deter a terrorist attack on modern society.
5
 Thus, a 
change from the general perspective involves investigating the deterrence of terrorist organizations 
without inference based on the nuclear deterrence theory that must not escalate a crisis at any cost. 
Almog (2004) presents the idea of cumulative deterrence, which has led to the past victories of Israel. 
In this case, the nation seeks to create an image of overwhelming military supremacy for enemy states 
and relies on retaliation against specific hostile acts in order to maintain its image of enormous power. 
―And through a combination of threatened retaliation and military superiority, Israel has been able to 
shape and reinforce its deterrent image in the Middle East.‖
6
 The concept of cumulative deterrence is 
                                                 
1 Tsuchiyama (2004: 177) presents a description of deterrence with citations of the statements of David Baldwin and 
Joseph Nye. Morgan (1983) makes a distinction between immediate and general deterrence. Morgan (2003) discusses 
also coercive diplomacy as a kind of deterrence. 
2 Art and Waltz (1971) mention deterrence before and after the nuclear age. 
3 Mearsheimer (1983) is an innovative work that deals with conventional deterrence. 
4 See Yaniv (1987) and Evron (1987, 1994, and 2007). 
5 Schweitzer (2007: 127) mentions this in the context of the Second Lebanon War. 
6 See Almog (2004: 12). 
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supported as an analytical framework by Zeev Maoz.
7
 Bar (2008) suggests making a distinction 
between strategy and tactics to analyze the deterrence of terrorist organizations. A random form of 
tactical management cannot deter a particular attack by a Katyusha rocket, but the Israelis are able to 
contain terrorist organizations with strategic deterrence by manipulating their relationship with the 
host population or patron states. According to an argument by Shmuel Bar,
8
 even non-state armed 
organizations such as the Hizbollah or Hamas are strategically containable because both of them 
govern the Lebanese region and are supported by Iran and Syria. Meanwhile, Iran regards Hizbollah as 
an important deterrent factor from the perspective of its potential confrontation with Israel over the 
nuclear issue. Moreover, Syria is dependent on Hizbollah as a buffer power against Israel.
9
 The proxy 
relationship between them seems to be easily deterred in the form of a conventional adversary. 
Meanwhile, Lupovici (2009: 214–215) indicated the overemphasis on the concept of deterrence 
with respect to defense in Israeli media and publications. His constructivist approach of International 
Relations or IR underscored that of the Winograd interim report, which urged the public to realize that 
Israel should deter the Hizbollah and that the erosion of deterrence had resulted in the Second Lebanon 
War. ―The context of deterrence identity led Israel to interpret the actions taken by Hizballah as a 
deterrence failure. In the absence of this context, there would have been no need for Israel to go to 
war.‖
10
 I disagree with this interpretation of the outbreak of the war on Lebanon. Lupovici’s style of 
explanation was not very persuasive because his discourse analysis and process tracing did not seem to 
clarify the causal relationship between deterrence identity and Israel’s decision to conduct air strikes 
on Lebanon. He focused on the context only with respect to the time line, and inadequately 
investigated the correlation between identity of deterrence and the Israeli incursion. He did not show 
control over several conditions for identifying the causality. His reference to counterfactuals in the 
above citation was not sufficient to satisfy the last test of control over any of the conditions. 
Thus, the concept of deterrence has been applied widely in Israeli security studies. However, little 
attention was paid to the effect of public opinion on national security in the framework of deterrence. 
In my opinion, deterrence is an idea that is similar to that of realist school that focuses on a state as a 
unit of analysis and places less emphasis on domestic affairs within the unit. A formal model of 
deterrence usually defines a state or a government as a player in the structure.
11
 To the best of my 
knowledge, no research work has hitherto been conducted to determine the role of electorates of 
democratic regimes in crisis that does not involve studies of audience cost. Fearon (1994) presented a 
                                                 
7 Maoz (2006) explains how Israel resorts to extensive use of limited forces for low-intensity warfare by cumulative 
deterrence. 
8 Personal interview with Bar on March 2, 2009 in Herzliya and Bar (2007). 
9 Here, we can consider deterrence policies with regard to Iran or Syria in the context of the international system or as 
a third image, as proposed by Kenneth Waltz. However, this topic would be furthered discussed in another research 
work. 
10 See Lupovici (2009: 216). 
11 See Powell (1990), Nicholson (1992), Zagare and Kilgour (2000), Schultz (2001), and Sartori (2005). 
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series of studies on crisis bargaining with the concept of audience cost described by a function. While 
the audience cost hypothesis was an innovation in the study of crisis management, it had several areas 
of concern with respect to the case of Israel. One of them involves the dubious logic that a democratic 
leader finds it difficult to conduct a back down in order to avoid a war under pressure from voters. Few 
journalistic works about the Israeli decision making process in international crisis comprehensively 
describe the trend of public opinion.
12
 Rather, public opinion seems to be shifting in favor of the 
government, following a difficultly made decision during an emergency. Over three quarters (77%) of 
the total number of Israeli citizens supported the Lebanon War in June 1982. Nevertheless, 
sympathizers of the war decreased drastically to 27 percent in 1985.
13
 As discussed later, this was 
repeted in the case of the Second Lebanon War. 
Apparently, it is assumed that a majority of the electorate supports the government during difficult 
situations such as a war. This implies that we should recognize a proposition that the public has less 
information than political leaders with respect to evaluating a relevant foreign policy. Robert Jervis 
mentioned ―the problem of dealing with complex and ambiguous information leads people to adopt 
shortcuts to rationality that simplify perceptions.‖
14
 The prospect theory admits an underlying 
tendency in people to strongly respond to strategic or economic loss than to comparative gains in an 
international conflict.
15
 It is easy to lead an estimation of increasing patriotic supporters for a 
government in a crisis as well as that of retaining the supporters after the emergency from the above 
arguments. Is estimation for explaining the trend of opinion polls during and after the wars on Lebanon 
adequate for investigation? 
This study aims to shed light on the causal mechanism of the influence of public opinion on the 
defense policy in the rational framework of deterrence strategy. The author agrees with the suggestion 
of Maoz (2006: 227): ―It is fair to argue, therefore, that public opinion was not an extremely powerful 
factor in forcing the government to change its strategy in Lebanon.‖ However, we will recognize that 
citizens in a democratic regime possess some power to influence the government in their desired 
direction with respect to a different logic from audience cost. If the government were armed with 
strong support from the nation, it would then be able to exercise leadership in warfare. On the other 
hand, the history of Israel shows that the political elite have reconsidered a national security policy 
under the pressure of people’s opposition. By employing a method such as the evolutionary game 
theory, an account of how the interacting behaviors of numerous players, which are similar to the 
fluctuations of public opinion, are generated. This study attempts to build a micro-foundation of mass 
behavior on the deterrence theory, which lacks content from the psychological perspective of the 
public. The theoretical provision for this has hitherto been insufficient despite extensive research 
                                                 
12 See Kfir (2006), Rapaport (2007), Shelah and Limor (2007), and Harel and Issacharoff (2008).  
13 Maoz (2006: 227) presents a table showing Israeli support for the First Lebanon War from 1982 to 1987. 
14 See Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (1989: 18). 
15 See Levy (1992: 285). 
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emphasizing the psychological effects on the logic of deterrence.
16
 
In the following section, I establish and solve a formal model of dynamics of public opinion using 
the tools of evolutionary game theory. The unique model is constructed on the basis of the deterrence 
mechanism even though it incorporates the attitude of the electorate. The orbit of solutions in the 
model will provide an explanation for the dynamic relationship between the process of foreign policy 
decision making and public opinion. In the next section, I present some case studies that are explained 
by the implication from my formal model. The 2000 unilateral withdrawal of Israel Defense Force 
from ―the security zone‖ in Lebanon demonstrates the effect of public opinion on strategic change in 
Israel. The 2006 Second Lebanon War exhibits the ―rallying ’round the flag‖ phenomenon
17
 wherein 
the combination of political and military leadership wages a war without any apprehension regarding 
the support from an overwhelming majority. 
 
2. The Evolutionary Dynamics of Public Opinion 
Let us consider the core of our analytical framework before the formalization of the dynamics of 
public opinions during war. Consider a simple deterrence game in which two players, a challenger and 
a defender, move according to their specific strategies. The challenger is able to choose an aggressive 
or passive attitude as per its decision. The alternatives for the defender are the same as that of the 
challenger. The game tree is depicted in Fig.1. Passive attitude by the challenger leads to the status 
quo; this does not result in a crisis. If the challenger follows an aggressive approach, the game depends 
on the defender’s move, which means that a crisis may be imminent. If the defender chooses a passive 
approach, the impact of the crisis may be in its concession. Else, the crisis may escalate to a war. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Deterrence Game 
 
Table 1 shows the payoff of the deterrence game. A few players reach the same point, zero, at status 
                                                 
16 Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (1989) is a prominent work that presents a theoretical relationship between deterrence and 
the psychology of decision makers by using several case studies. 
17 Kuperman (2003) examines the phenomenon as the effect of domestic pressure on governmental decisions to use 
military force. 
Challenger     Defender 
        Concede 
       Aggressive          Passive 
     Passive      Aggressive 
 
        Status Quo         War 
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quo. When the defender concedes the aggressive attitude of the challenger and the crisis does not 
escalate, the defender loses and the challenger achieves the payoff V. Unfortunately, if a war occurs, 
the challenger would win with probability ―p‖ in the analytical framework. Therefore, the payoff of 
the challenger is given as pV – c1; ci, i ∈ {1, 2}; and 1 is the challenger, whereas 2 is the defender, 
which refers to the cost of war of i. The defender’s payoff is –pV – c2 during the stage of crisis 
escalation. 
 
 Challenger Defender 
Status Quo 0 0 
War pV – c1 –pV – c2 
Concede V –V 
Table 1: Payoff Matrix of Deterrence Game 
 
Evolutionary game theory is useful for formalizing a dynamic game among multiple players without 
considering aspects of rationality, such as public opinion. We assume that people are not necessarily 
rational and that they exhibit an aggressive attitude during times of crisis. The notations are explained 
as follows: Strategy A refers to an aggressive approach by both players, whereas strategy B refers to a 
passive approach by both. The fraction x (t) indicates that the challenger chooses strategy A on time 
line – t. Let y (t) be the fraction of the defender’s playing strategy A on time line – t. Uij is the utility 
function of player i with strategy j ∈ {A, B}. It is assumed that trial-and-error dynamics is used to 
rethink the strategy in accordance with the repeated interactive process in the game.
18
 Israel has had 
several wars with Arab states in addition to conflicts with armed organizations. It is suitable to adapt 
the trial-and-error type learning dynamics in investigating Israeli attitudes. Consider the increments x 
and y of both fractions for deriving a differential equation. The formal form of the expectations of ∆x 
and ∆y are given by the following equations: 
 E ∆𝑥 = 𝑥 1 − 𝑥 (U1A − U1B) 
 E ∆𝑦 = 𝑥𝑦 1 − 𝑦  U2A − U2B .       (1) 
 
The purpose behind the x added on the right side of the E(∆y) equation may require an explanation. 
The notation y refers to the probability that the defender follows an aggressive approach. The defender 
can determine his option only after the challenger has moved on to the aggressive approach. The 
significance of y (t) holds if and only if the aggressive challenger emerges on the probability x. 
A differential equation is a tool to analyze the dynamics of the probabilities that both the challenger 
                                                 
18 Evolutionary game theory has formalized social phenomena into a dynamic game; a state change over time. Oura 
(2008, 179–184.) explains the trial-and-error method as one of the learning dynamics for players in a group setting for 
selecting their strategies. 
7 
 
and the defender choose strategy A or B on the time line. It can be expressed in the following form: 
  E(∆𝑦)/E(∆𝑥)  =
dy
dx
= 𝑦(1 − 𝑦){(1 − p)V − c2 }/(1 − 𝑥){−pV + c1)𝑦 + V}.                 (2) 
Consider a stationary in equation (2). The ranges of x and y are the same, to one from zero. The corner 
points are (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), and (1, 1). They refer to each result of the game. A back down by the 
challenger leads to status quo, which means that x = 0 and y = 0 or 1. The defender’s concede is the 
result of both x = 1 and y = 0. The crisis escalates to war at (x, y) = (1, 1). While the corners are 
stationary states, stabilities may not always exist in the game. 
Observe the right term of the product in upper equation (1), U1A – U1B = y(pV – c1) + (1 – y)V – 0. 
When U1A and U1B are indifferent, we regard the condition of y as λ = V/{(1 p)V + c1}. λ exists over a 
range from zero to one because λ is a specific value of y. If y < λ, E[∆x] is positive. This implies that 
the challengers will be aggressive with an expectation of no retaliation. If y > λ, the defenders indicate 
a high likelihood of retaliation, then E[∆x] is negative; and the challengers will exhibit passive attitude. 
Under the condition that the right term of the product in lower equation (1) is negative, U2A – U2B < 0, 
the evolutionary dynamics of public opinions in the deterrence game are shown in Fig.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Unstable Deterrence Game Dynamics 
 
Fraction x of the Challenger playing 
Aggressive 
Fraction y of the 
Defender playing 
Aggressive 
War 
Concede 
SQ 
λ 
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When the utility of the defender’s following strategy 2 or passive is larger than it following strategy 
1 or aggressive, the equilibrium is status quo or concede. Even if a war has occurred, it does not hold 
on and the dynamics move easily to other stationeries—SQ, Status Quo, which is represented by a 
bold line between λ and one, or concede, under the condition. While status quo is a stable result, it is 
only a trivial case because the dynamics have a tendency to aim for the point (1, 0) or the concede with 
only a small part of fraction x. Fig. 2 is a phase diagram that describes the solution vectors. Fraction x 
decreases over time, where y > λ; otherwise, x increases. E[∆y] is always negative because of U2A – 
U2B < 0, so that the fraction of y must decrease over time. Therefore, under the condition of U2A – U2B 
is negative, it follows from these arguments that the threat of deterrence is not reliable for the 
challenger and that the situation forced the defender to concede in conflicts. 
Let us consider other criteria in the dynamic game of deterrence. Suppose that the defenders prefer 
following strategy B to strategy A, which means that player 2’s utility with strategy B is larger than 
that with strategy A. The behavior of x is the same in the case of unstable deterrence; E[∆x] > 0, where 
y > λ, E[∆x] < 0 otherwise. This condition results in that E[∆y] is always positive because U2A – U2B > 
0. Fig. 3 shows the phase diagram of the game with the interaction of the challengers and defenders. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Stable Deterrence Game Dynamics 
 
Fraction y of Defender 
playing Aggressive 
Fraction x of Challenger playing Aggressive 
SQ 
λ 
War 
Concede 
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All solution orbits converge at the bold line on the vertical axis, which refers to the status quo. 
Assuming that U2A – U2B > 0, the payoff to aggressive defenders is always higher than that to passive 
defenders. Excluding the perception problem, the challengers can recognize the intention of the 
defenders, and thus, the threat of deterrence is credible. Fraction x for the challengers gradually 
increases, as observed by its consistent left-to-right movement under line λ. The flows show the 
increasing prevalence of bellicose mood in the real world. However, the crisis may almost escalate to 
war, and it may end the status quo when the challenger acknowledges the amount of fraction y. The 
solution (0, 1) is stationary as well as stable for both challengers and defenders. As a result, the 
deterrence is sustainable. 
The stable deterrence game has a paradoxical implication. In spite of the equilibrium, a crisis can 
easily escalate according to the growth of the fraction x, who play aggressively. If the political leaders 
of the challenger expected that the fraction y of the defenders who ―retaliate‖ is low because of 
misperception or wishful thinking, they would resort to risky and provocative actions. This argument 
describes frequent escalation in international disputes among the players with tough public. 
 
3. Empirical Illustration of Unilateral Withdrawal from Lebanon and the Second 
Lebanon War 
 
3.1. Case Study I: IDF’s Unilateral Withdrawal from Lebanon 
The IDF continued to occupy South Lebanon as a ―security zone‖ for over fifteen years. The end of 
the occupation, led by Prime Minister Ehud Barak, occurred on May 24, 2000. Why did Israel decide 
to end the occupation for the security of the northern border? Did Israel believe that the concept of 
strategic depth no longer make sense under the threat of Iran’s ballistic missiles? Were the Syria-Israel 
peace negotiations likely to succeed and did the government perceive the occupation as an obstacle to 
further reconciliation with Syria? Else, did the occupation in Lebanon become a burden for the 
political economy in Israel? 
According to Kaye (2002–03), Israeli citizens groups, particularly the Four Mothers movement, 
exerted domestic pressure on the government to withdraw from Lebanon. These groups were 
organized by war bereaved or ordinary people who questioned the significance of Israel’s military 
presence in Lebanon. The 1997 helicopter crash that killed thirty-eight soldiers had a strong impact 
that led to rethinking the necessity of the ―security zone.‖ The increasing number of combat casualties 
emphasized the strategic value of the occupation in Lebanon. Fig.4 presents the number of Israeli 
soldiers killed in South Lebanon. It shows that 74 soldiers were killed in only 1997. 
Citizen groups led a movement to criticize the Lebanon policy and debate over the national security 
problem about northern Israel, which was regarded as taboo. The voice of supporting unilateral 
withdrawal from Lebanon without negotiation was increasing gradually in the late 1990s. According 
10 
 
to the poll conducted by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, a minority of citizens, 41 percent, 
recommended unilateral withdrawal in 1997. The military evacuation supporters leaped upward by 44 
percent in 1998 and then became a majority (55%) in 1999. Ultimately, a large majority in 2000, 62 
percent of Israelis, supported ending the occupation in Lebanon.
19
 
 
 
Figure 4: IDF Combat Casualties in South Lebanon 
Source: Ronen Bergman (2007) Point of No Return. Kineret: Zmora-Bitan, pp.335–336. 
(*) The number of people killed in 1997 does not include the victims of the helicopter accident. 
 
The Lebanese problem became a central issue in the 1999 election campaign. Three years earlier, the 
government of Israel conducted a military operation in Lebanon, which was called ―Grapes of Wrath.‖ 
This was in response to a series of Hizbollah attacks on Kiryat Shumona and Northern Galilee. It arose 
from speculation by Prime Minister Simon Peres, who wanted to appeal his ―strong‖ side in foreign 
policy to the electorate. In spite of his effort, Benjamin Netanyahu won the next direct election for the 
Prime Minister in 1996. Fig.4 clearly shows the growing cost of Israeli presence in South Lebanon 
during the latter half of the 1990s. According to Steinberg (2001: 192), ―[i]n early 1998, following 
more attacks and Israeli casualties, Netanyahu launched his second initiative on Lebanon,‖ which 
called for withdrawal supported by Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, who was the head of the 
                                                 
19 See Arian (2000: 24) 
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Northern Command of the IDF. This approach did not yield any results during his tenure. Meanwhile, 
the Prime Ministerial candidate of the Labor Party, Ehud Barak, criticized Netanyahu’s initiatives for 
the Lebanese problem. 
Barak had issued a statement about bringing IDF troops back as a campaign pledge, and defeated 
Netanyahu in the 1999 elections. Barak’s pledge turned into reality on May 24, 2000, despite 
opposition from military leaders and analysts. It may seem too simple to consider that the decision to 
withdraw from the security zone arose from strong public support. However, the undeniable fact is that 
Israeli public opinion played an important role in influencing the policy makers for a dramatic turning 
point in Israeli security policy. On the other hand, strategic specialists would generally regard 
unilateral withdrawal as a concession to Hizbollah. According to Hizbollah, the withdrawal of the IDF 
signified its triumph, and thus, it could appeal its own as changeable power to the deterrent balance 
between itself and Israel. In fact, Hassan Nasrallah addressed the emancipation proclamation in South 
Lebanon as the declaration of the victory of Hizbollah
20
 on May 26 2000, and gained popularity 
among Lebanese citizens. Therefore, the episode of the unilateral withdrawal of the IDF from South 
Lebanon reflected the dynamic mechanism of the unstable deterrence game showed in Fig.2. 
 
3.2. Case Study II: The Second Lebanon War 
The Israeli government decided to conduct air strikes in the reign of Lebanon on the night of July 12, 
2006. The massive bombardment was regarded as retaliation for the three IDF soldiers who were 
killed and two who were abducted at the border by Hizbollah. In an interview broadcasted on an 
Al-Manar TV program, Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah stated that his party was responsible for 
the incident and he appealed to the Israeli government to negotiate for an exchange of soldiers for 
prisoners. However, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert rebuffed the negotiation for the prisoner’s 
exchange; the decision of his cabinet was to hold a war. 
This marked the beginning of thirty-three days of war between a democratic state and an armed 
organization in the Middle East. Israel not only assaulted the bases of resistance in South Lebanon and 
Beirut, but also caused extensive damage in various regions to influence on Lebanon’s public opinion 
not to support Hezbollah. The war killed 1187 Lebanese citizens, displaced 740 thousand people, as 
well as created 230 thousand refugees out of the state. Israel’s fierce attacks caused the destruction of 
social infrastructure in Lebanon, such as roads, dwellings, bridges, power plants, airports, and docks.
21
 
According to Romm (2007: 52), Hizbollah lost a vast majority of long-range rockets—dozens of 
Zelzal II—as well as a large portion of medium-range rocket launchers (around one thousand of Fadjr 
III and Fadjr V) within thirty five minutes. This implied that their strategic deterrence power 
disappeared in an instant. Their entire range of arms of militia included only 13,000 Katyusha–type 
                                                 
20  It means the so-called ―spider’s web‖ speech in Bint Jbail. 
21 See Osoekawa (2008: 131) and Suechika (2009: 190). 
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short-range small rockets
22
 that were fired at enemy territory across the border. However, nearly 4,000 
rockets targeted at population centers in the northern area were adequate to intimidate daily life in 
Israel during the war. Hizbollah effectively operated mobile launcher systems for the remaining 
Katyusha rockets with cell phones and motorbikes under command of the headquarters in order to hide 
and fire rockets. Further, the organization of the militia was decentralized and was suitable for 
hit-and-run tactics within the territory, difficult for reconnaissance in IDF ground operations, 
particularly in the Baalbek Valley.
23
  
It is believed that the government of Israel made several mistakes during the war in Lebanon. The 
Winograd Committee, appointed by the government for investigation, stated that there were many 
serious failures in the decision making process among the combination of unskilled political leaders, 
and that the office staff preferred a military settlement. The Defense Minister during that period, Amir 
Peretz, had no experience in foreign or defense affairs. In fact, he had never served as a member of the 
Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee without even combat experiences. Apparently, it was 
difficult for him to play the role of a leader during wartime. Olmert was also as inexperienced as Peretz 
in military matters. A public opinion poll a month before the war indicated their unpopularity arising 
from their inexperience.
24
 The Chief of Staff Dan Harutz was severely criticized in the Winograd 
Report because the committee regarded him as the main source of information concerning the military 
operation and he occupied the position to present correct information and appropriate opinions with 
recommendations of the civilian leadership. The Winograd committee indicated his responsibility was 
greater from his disinformation about the preparation of the operations
25
. 
The IDF was ready to draft a plan regarding military operations for deterrence to Hizbollah’s attack 
in 2000.
26
 It was widely believed that Harutz relied on the air force to destroy ―terrorist‖ 
organizations.
27
 The conditions in Israel were such that it could easily wage a war against Lebanon. 
According to Evron’s diagnosis of the Israeli-Hizbollah deterrence equation, ―Israeli response appears 
to have indeed strengthened Israeli deterrence against Hizbollah.‖ Further, ―Israel was right to avoid it 
(the large scale operation) during the last campaign because of the burden of a long and costly 
counterinsurgency campaign, but it might opt for it were Hizbollah to provoke it.‖
28
 Here, we will not 
evaluate, but discuss this war as an empirical case study for our evolutionary game theoretic model. 
Fig. 5 indicates that over eighty percent of the citizens had justified the government’s decision 
                                                 
22 Sobelman (2004) points out that the arsenal serves as the main component in the deterrence power of Hezbollah. 
23 See Farkash (2007: 79). 
24 According to Ben Meir (2007: 88), only 40 percent of the Israelis approved of Olmert as the prime minister. Further, 
the positive rating was particularly low, with a value in the range of the middle twenties. 
25  The Press Release of the Winograd committee, April 30, 2007.  
26 See Harel and Issacharoff (2008: 59–73) for details on the preparation for the war at the General Headquarters of 
IDF. 
27 See Kober (2008: 18, 21–22). 
28 See Evron (2007: 40). 
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regarding IDF attack on Lebanon during the war.
29
 The research unit of the BI and Lucille Cohen 
Institute of Tel Aviv University conducted several waves of public opinion surveys for Israeli citizens, 
and was able to present fluctuations in the opinions and attitudes toward government policy on the 
warfare. This showed that the Israelis held a stern and strict attitude during the duration of the 
operation in Lebanon. Ben Meir (2007: 90) explained that there was a clear consensus among the 
Israelis on Hizbollah’s attack as unprovoked violence on their own sovereign and undisputed territory 
that originated from areas unilaterally withdrawn six years ago. Further, Elran (2007: 108) mentioned 
that the public attained a determination to withstand the burden of war with reference to a survey 
conducted on August 1, 2007, by the Tami Steinmetz Center. 
 
 
Figure 5: Justification of the War and Approval of the Government’s Performance 
 Source: Shavit, Ya’ar, Herman, and Adler (2006). 
 
The Lebanese Government Secretary Nabih Beri issued a proclamation about prisoner’s exchange 
for Israel as an initiative by the government on July 23. This implied that the Lebanese government 
aligned with Hizbollah ten days later at the beginning of the war in order to tackle the bombardment by 
Israel. According to Harel and Issacharoff (2008: 145), Israel began to seriously consider an exit plan 
for the war. However, the IDF lost nine soldiers during the battles of Bint Jbail and Maroun er Ras. The 
sudden drop in the government handling approval on July 27 seemed to reflect the previous day’s 
firefights in Bint Jbeil where the IDF encountered strong defenses.
30
 Over 200 storm-like Katyusha 
                                                 
29 The exact question for the justification of the war was ―Is the Israeli attack on Lebanon justified or unjustified?‖ 
30 See Bidel and Friedman (2008: 31). 
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rockets struck northern Israel on August 2. 
31
 On August 10, a Katyusha rocket attack killed fifteen 
reserve soldiers at Kibbutz Kfar Giladi. These events may have made the Israeli public opinion more 
hostile and bellicose. Meanwhile, the approval of government leadership on the war was eventually 
decreasing, and in fact, it was fewer than forty percent on the day when ceasefire was declared. Ben 
Meir (2007: 97–98) presented some reasons for the slump in the evaluation of the Prime Minister, 
Defense Minister, and IDF Chief of Staff from high preference to disapproval. The first reason was 
that there were exaggerated expectations from the government since it set unrealistic goals to 
eliminate Hizbollah, destroy its base and depots, and rescue the kidnapped reservists. The second one 
was that the broadcasting of the increasing number of causalities banished the optimism regarding the 
war, particularly after the ground operations. The last reason involved grievances among the returning 
reservists from the battlefield. They expressed complaints about mismanagement, confusion, turmoil, 
and gloomy prospects among the leadership. Consequently, their widespread dissatisfaction led to a 
decrease in the popularity of political and military leaders. This seems to be an ominous signal of the 
censure of responsibility of the Olmert government during wartime. 
It is important to mention here that the case of the Second Lebanon War follows the same logic of 
the stable deterrence game that is shown in Fig.3. The raid in the northern front provoked Israeli 
reprisal and triggered the extreme acts of violence in Lebanon, supported by an overwhelming 
majority of the public. The start of the war may be regarded as a case of poor judgment, and the 
expansion of the ground operations may be perceived as a mistake by the government from the modern 
perspective not only because of the disempowerment of Hizbollah’s rockets, but also because of the 
lack of progress in implementing disarmament by the international intervention conducted by the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1559 of 2004. Israelis may bear considerable losses to fight with 
Hizbollah in South Lebanon. This follows that the citizens felt the war cost was not worth the benefit. 
However, the situation returned to the status quo after the declaration of ceasefire on August 13. The 
Second Lebanon War ended with a United Nations Security Council ceasefire implemented by Israel 
and Hezbollah at the morning on August 14. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Many researchers, journalists, and analysts regard that the war ended in failure for the Israelis
32
 and 
some even believe that Hizbollah is regarded as the ―winner of the war.‖
33
 This may not be a minor 
opinion among Israeli commentators. However, is it a proper assessment with respect to considering 
                                                 
31 Romm (2007:57) presents the number of Katyusha rockets fired during the war. 
32 Achcar with Warschawski (2007: 40–41), Brom (2007: 13), Eiland (2008:31), Harel and Issacharoff (2008: 241), 
and a personal interview with Bar on March 2, 2009. 
33 Deeb (2008: 72) mentioned that ―Not only in Lebanon, but also across the Middle Eastern region, it believed that the 
July war was a victory for Hizballah.‖ Norton (2007: 149) concluded that ―when successful resistance in South 
Lebanon helped to inspire Palestinian militants to wage their own uprising against Israel, a pro-Hezbollah sentiment 
emerged in the Palestinian territories on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.‖ 
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the logic of deterrence? The war in Lebanon ended without victors
34
 in my evaluation. The reason for 
the recognition of failed military operations in the summer of 2006 among the public is that Prime 
Minister Ehud Olmert set an impossible goal of conducting an air strike during a short time span, and 
as a result, the nation was disappointed at the performance under the leadership of the Israeli 
government. As shown by Brom (2007: 19), the war could have lasted only for the first three days. It is 
true that the mismanagement of the cabinet and the general staff of Israel led to the failure at the 
Second Lebanon War. 
Both Hizbollah and the residents of South Lebanon suffered from considerable physical and 
psychological damage caused by the warfare. Hassan Nasrallah owed his duty to rehabilitate the Shiite 
community, to repair destroyed houses, to support the life of the bereaved and the refugees, and to 
compensate for the lost possessions of his main electorates, not as the head of an armed organization, 
but as the leader of a political party, the secretary general of the Lebanese Islamist Party, that had 
fourteen representatives in the parliament.
35
 Further, he must endeavor to rebuild the bruised 
organization and its military as well as civilian infrastructure. While Israel could not completely 
eliminate Hizbollah, it substantially destroyed its military force. Hizbollah has to recover before it 
could regain and increase its deterrent capability against Israel with the support of Iran and Syria. 
The state of Israel retaliated an assault and kidnapping conducted by Hizbollah. Nasrallah did 
miscalculate the response of Israel; he admitted this later,
36
 and eventually, the crisis escalated to war. 
The revolutionary game theoretic model successfully depicts the dynamics of bellicose opinion among 
Israeli citizens in wartime. The logic of stable deterrence game dynamics drove the war between Israel 
and Hizbollah into the status quo. However, Israel should not have spent thirty-three days for the war, 
and it should not have conducted the ground operations in South Lebanon in order to restore 
deterrence.  
Democratic governments require strong support from the electorate in order to conduct a severe 
project like a war. Deterrence policy necessitates bellicose passion among citizens under a democracy. 
If a challenger chose an aggressive policy and a crisis is turned on, the status quo would be restored 
with the condition y > λ. Otherwise, a defender would be compelled to concede its position because of 
the increase in fraction x among the population. The general staff of the IDF could not reject the order 
of unilateral withdrawal from the security zone in South Lebanon under the pressure of public opinion 
in 2000. The withdrawal of the Israeli army is considered as concede arising from the defender’s 
passive move in Fig.1. A majority of the citizens believed that the occupation at the south of the Litani 
River was not secured by sporadic violence. On July 12, 2006, under the impression that the military 
incident threatened the status quo, the Israeli government made the decision to use the force. Thus, as 
                                                 
34 Zisser (2007: 135) made a similar diagnosis. 
35 See Zisser (2007: 141–144). 
36 Several studies present this episode. See Norton (2007: 137) and Schweitzer (2007: 128). 
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shown by the model, the citizens supported the decision of the government to retaliate against 
Hizbollah. 
Eight–and-a-half months since the end of the war, the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research of 
Tel Aviv University conducted a poll about the Second Lebanon War. The result showed that a clear 
majority of 57% still justified the war in Lebanon,
37
 even though the rate of support decreased largely 
from that during the wartime. This implies that the public believes that the decision to conduct a war is 
justifiable in order to restore deterrence. However, the cost was too expensive to pay for recovering the 
status quo. 
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